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INTRODUCTION
Cultural Models (CMs) are a way to
organize mental knowledge (Holland and
Quinn, 1987; Bennardo and De Munck,
2014) within communities of various
sizes. Regarding their internal organiza-
tion, causality plays a major role in CMs’
structure/s. A widely accepted way to rep-
resent causality in a variety of domains is
that of using causal models (Sloman, 2009;
Rips, 2011). I propose to think about and
use the concept of causal model as a funda-
mental aspect of CMs. I provide a tentative
exemplification of this proposal by looking
at causal models in CMs of nature.
CULTURAL MODELS AND CAUSAL
MODELS
CMs are assemblages of mental knowledge
(i.e., models/representations of the world)
shared within a population. CMs func-
tion as mental lenses used in understand-
ing, in reasoning, in planning actions,
and they may motivate/generate action
as well (D’Andrade and Strauss, 1992).
CMs are systems, that is, they are con-
stituted by units (e.g., concepts, events,
foundational CMs, molar cultural mod-
els, etc.) and relationships among these
units. Relationships among conceptual
units (including CMs of same or differ-
ent molarity) can be of different types.
For example, they can be sequential,
taxonomic (also partonomic), and causal.
Sloman affirms that the logic of causal-
ity is an invariant of and the best guide
to human reasoning and knowledge orga-
nization (Sloman, 2009, p. 20). Rips suc-
cessfully maintains that our ability to infer
causality from co-occurrence of events
depends on higher-level beliefs, i.e., causal
models, about what sort of events can
cause others (Rips, 2011, p. 150). He also
states that: “Identifying causes requires a
healthy dose of theory to direct our search.
We can’t understand these abstract matters
unless the appropriate schemas are already
in place” (Rips, 2011, p. 123). In other
words, schemas or theories (I prefer the
term “model” as in Johnson-Laird, 1980,
1983, 1999) guide and/or generate our
causal thinking. Causality, then, appears to
be part and parcel of our knowledge of the
world while at the same time it depends
on knowledge being organized in CMs.
This leads to my current proposal of seeing
causal models embedded within CMs.
One way in which causality is described
and explained is by the use of causal mod-
els. First, though, let’s see how we can
define a cause or a causal relation. Sloman
writes that
“A causal relation suggests a mechanism
unfolding over time . . . so the notion
of cause involves change over time . . .
[C]ausal relations relate entities that
exist in and therefore are bounded in
time. I will refer to such entities as events
or classes of events . . . Causal relations . . .
associate events with other events” [orig-
inal italics] (Sloman, 2009, pp. 21–22).
If representing the world includes funda-
mentally the representation of events and
if events are mostly associated by causal
relations, then, it is these latter that need
to be an essential component of CMs.
Causal relations are typically repre-
sented by causal models. A causal model
consists of (1) a Graph whose input are
(2) the World and (3) the Probability
Distribution. The World consists of the
“causal system” we want to represent, a
part of the world, e.g., fire, sparks, oxy-
gen, energy source, etc. The Probability
Distribution consists of the likelihood that
certain events (i.e., the content of the
World) exist and the likelihood of them
going together. For example, while the
probability P of fire is typically low, it
becomes high when sparks, oxygen, and
energy source co-occur, and it becomes
zero when there is no oxygen. The Graph
consists of a representation of the rela-
tions among events (i.e., the content of
the World) by means of boxes (stand-
ing for concepts, events, etc.) and arrows
(standing for causal relations). It is the co-
presence of oxygen, sparks, and an energy
source (3 boxes) that causes (arrow) fire.
Causal Models have been suggested to
play a role in reasoning, decision making,
judgments, conceptual structure, categor-
ical induction, language, and learning.
Relevant to our discussion is the role that
they play in conceptual structure since




Concepts do not only represent sets of
objects in the world, but also a set of pos-
sible objects. As such they are represent-
ing actual and counterfactual objects. This
characteristic of concepts is very close to
that of causal models insofar as they both
can represent possible worlds. Causal rela-
tions then can be critical for categoriza-
tion. Sloman (2009, p. 120) suggests that
it would be worth using causal models in
exploring relationships not only between
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events but also between properties of
objects.
As an exemplification of this possibil-
ity, Sloman introduces a discussion of the
theory of function for artifacts proposed
by Chaigneau et al. (2004). This theory
suggests that the function of an object is
related to the following aspects of the same
object: its Historical role, the Intentions
of an agent using the object, its Physical
structure, and the Events that occur when
it is used (that is why this theory is also
known as the HYPE theory of objects).
Finally it is suggested that all these pieces
of information are related via a causal
model (see Sloman, 2009, p. 122).
The process of categorization that
includes a causal model theory of concep-
tual structure assumes two stages: the first
stage relates to some sensory experience;
the second stage uses the sensory experi-
ence as a cue to retrieve concepts from
memory in the form of a causal model
(Sloman, 2009, p. 125). For example, one
might look at the sky and see what one
would interpret to be wings and a body.
Then, one also hears a roaring sound.
At first, one may retrieve a causal model
in which “has wings,” “has body,” and “has
feathers” are related causally to “can fly.”
This model though would not fit one’s cur-
rent sensory experience (especially leaving
the “roaring sound” unaccounted). In an
attempt to account for the roaring sound,
one would access a causal model in which
“has wheels,” “has body,” and “has engine”
would be related causally to a box named
“can drive,” while at the same time the
“has engine” would cause “makes noise.”
The “can drive” box would cause the “can
transport people” one. While this model
explains the roaring sound by the pres-
ence of a causing “engine,” it introduces
the concepts of “wheels” and “drive” that
are not present in one’s current sensory
experience.
Finally, a causal model is accessed and
activated in which “has wings,” “has body,”
and “has engines” cause a box named
“can fly” while the “has engines” box by
itself causes “makes loud noise.” The “can
fly” box would also be causally related
to a “can transport people” one. This
last model is a good fit for one’s sensory
experience and provides a plausible causal
explanation of all the elements one sensed
(Sloman, 2009, p. 126).
Objects may be associated with a num-
ber of causal models and the one that is
activated depends on people’s intentions in
dealing with them as well as on the context
within which people and objects may be
located. What remains constant though is
the fact that the relevant knowledge about
objects is organized as a causal model in
spite of the variety of intentions that peo-
ple may have in specific contexts (Sloman,
2009, p 128). In addition, categorization
serves a multitude of purposes and not all
of them can be served by referring to causal
properties. These latter are paramount
when categorization is intended to reveal
the reasons why an object exists, what
its use is, what its origin is, and how it
works.
CULTURAL MODELS OF NATURE
I am currently heading a collaborative
research project sponsored by NSF about
the cross-cultural concept of nature. The
project includes 15 scholars collecting data
in 15 communities of primary food pro-
ducers all over the world. We have pre-
pared a methodological protocol that will
be used by all of us both to collect and
analyze data (Bennardo, 2012). By the
end of 2014, all the data will be col-
lected and the analyses should yield a
number of preliminary concepts of nature
held within the communities. These con-
cepts will be verified by further data
collection and a consensus analysis to
be conducted in each community the
following year.
The concept of nature is a “com-
plex concept” (see Keller and Lehman,
1991) and I prefer to call it a CM. I
have already proposed that a fundamen-
tal aspect of any CM is that it contains
a causal model. In addition, Sloman’s
(2009) suggestion of the role of causal
models in categorization (concept forma-
tion) has also convinced me that the con-
cepts/CMs of nature do include causal
models as their fundamental constituent
element.
Before benefiting from the results of the
mentioned project, I have prepared three
“hypotheses” of CMs of nature that are
structured to include causal models. In
other words, the three CMs of nature I
am suggesting include three slightly differ-
ent types of causal models. The examples
of CMs of nature I am using are personal
renditions of suggestions in Kempton et al.
(1995), in Selin (2003), in Atran and
Medin (2008), and in Bennardo et al.
(2012).
The first CM of nature can be labeled
“holistic” and it is typical of popu-
lations whose religion is Buddhism,
Confucianism, Shinto, and others (see
Selin, 2003). Within this model, all the
major elements of the existing world
are part of “one” reality which does not
have privileged agents (Figure 1A). As
such, the causal model in this CM of
nature would have these constituent ele-
ments in the World part: humans, animals,
plants, physical environment, weather,
and the supernatural. In the Probability
Distribution part, only a combination in
which all the constituent elements of the
CM of nature in the World part appear
receives a high score, while whenever one
of the elements is missing, the score would
be zero. In the Graph part there would be
a box with a list of all the elements and
an arrow (indicating cause) leading to the
concept/CM of nature.
The second CM of nature I called
“supernatural” insofar as it implies a sep-
aration of a supernatural/creator being
from all the other elements in the World
part of the causal model (Figure 1B). In
the Probability Distribution the presence
of any elements of nature without the
supernatural would receive a low or zero
score, while the score becomes higher
when supernatural and other elements of
nature appear together. The Graph part of
the causal model sees the box of super-
natural causing all the other elements, i.e.,
humans, animals, plants, physical environ-
ment, and weather. This causal relation-
ship finally leads to the causation of the
concept/CM of nature.
The third CM is labeled “supernatu-
ral/humans” because these two elements
of the World are assigned a privileged
position (Figure 1C). The supernatural is
still causing all the other elements of the
world as in the previous model, but now
“humans” are separated both from the
“causing” supernatural and from animals,
plant, physical environment, and weather.
Humans do not cause these latter and they
are directly caused by the supernatural.
These causal models—suggested as
constituents of different CMs of nature—
are only three out of other possible ones.
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FIGURE 1 | Three Causal Models of Nature. (A) Holistic, (B) Supernatural, and (C) Supernatural/Humans.
It is important to notice that at the
Probability Distribution level/part, culture
plays a very fundamental role. That is,
since perception of the world depends on
cultural saliency, the probability distribu-
tion of the constituent elements of the con-
cept of nature are dependent on cultural
choices. Thus, cultural saliency determines
the (perceptual and probable) choices
that are then represented in the (causal)
Graph.
Once the project is completed, we are
convinced that we will be able to fill in
some of the missing data—especially at
the Probability Distribution level—that will
lead to a refinement of the CMs of nature
we are after and their internal causal mod-
els. I believe that the introduction of causal
models in CM theorizing provides a suit-
able way to enhance our cross-cultural
understanding of the mental organization
of knowledge.
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